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NEW COMMUNIST CIVIL CODES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND
POLAND: A GENERAL APPRAISAL
ALEKSANDER W RUDZINSKIt
NEW CIVIL CODES
A remarkably abundant crop of new civil codes has been harvested
late in 1963 and during 1964 in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R.
In Czechoslovakia at least five important civil law statutes were enacted.
A statute concerning family law' was enacted simultaneously with a code
on foreign trade (zakonik mezinar6dniho obchodu) on December 4,
1963.2 They were followed by a new civil code (obansky zfikonik) of
February 26, 1964' and a separate statute of the same date concerning
management of apartments (hospodareni s byty) . Finally, a special
code governing the (socialized) economy (hospodarsky zakonik) was
passed on June 4, 1964.'
In Poland a new family code was adopted on February 25, 1964,'
and on April 23, 1964, a new civil code which entered into force on
January 1, 1965. In the Soviet Union, where the Fundamental Principles
of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics were adopted
by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on December 8, 1961, many
Republics adopted new codes; the R.S.F.S.R. enacted a new civil code on
June 11, 1964' which entered into force on October ., 1964.
This paper does not attempt to deal with all the above mentioned
statutes. It restricts its scope to the new Czechoslovak and Polish civil
codes and tries to evaluate their more striking and characteristic features
as well as their political and ideological significance.
I Associate in Public Law, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia
University.
1. Law of December 4, 1964, Sbirka [hereinafter cited as Sb.] No. 94.
2. Sb. No. 101. The Statute on International Private and Procedural Law, and the
new CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1964) were also adopted the same day.
3. Sb. No. 40 replacing the CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REP'BLIC [hereinafter cited
as C.S.R.] Crvm CODE (1950). Sb. No. 40 entered into force on April 1, 1964.
4. Sb. No. 41.
5. Sb. No. 109.
6. Dz. U. No. 9 poz. 59 replacing the PoLISH FAmILY CODE (1950).
7. Dz. U. No. 16 poz. 93 replacing with some exceptions the pre-war POLISH CODE
OF OBLIGATIONS (1933), the POLISH COMMERCIAL CODE (1934), the Law of Property of
October 11, 1946, the Inheritance Law of October 8, 1946 and the General Provisions of
Civil Law of July 18, 1950. A new code of civil procedure was enacted on November 17,
1964, Dz. U. No. 43, poz. 296, and entered into force on January 1, 1965, replacing the
POLISH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1932).
8. Sovetskaia Iustitsia No. 13-14, July 1964, replacing the RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FED-
ERATED SovrET REPUBLIC [hereinafter cited as R.S.F.S.R.] CIVIL CODE (1922).
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REVOLUTIONARY AND NON-REVOLUTIONARY CODES
Continental jurists, liberal and Marxist alike, are unanimous in con-
sidering some civil codes as monumental and significant edifices of legal
creativity, and as important stations along the road of evolution of human
civilization to be placed in the same category as the Pyramids, Dante's
Divine Comedy, and Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principid Matize-
matica. Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis and the French Code Napolion
of 1804 come easily to mind. Obviously not all of past and existing civil
codes can pretend to such a high rank. However, all are products of the
society and civilization which brought them about, and all have a broad
eloquence and significance which surpass the strictly technical field of
legal concepts, legal doctrine and legal solutions.
The Code Napolion represents a special subcategory important for
our purposes, which could be called a revolutionary civil code-revolu-
tionary in the sense that it was the fruit of the great French social and
political revolution. This does not imply that all or most of the revolu-
tionary changes were brought about by this code. The revolutionary
upheaval in the legal and economic status of the individual, equality
before the law, civil liberties, the abolition of class privileges, the radical
reform in the tenure of real property, in the order of inheritance, in the
system of mortgages, the introduction of civil marriages and civil
divorces-all these fundamental measures amounting to the abolition
of the feudal system were already effected by a number of statutes
enacted by the National Assembly and the Convention starting in 1789.'
The Code Napolion consolidated the new legal order in a systematic
manner, even rejecting some excesses of the revolutionary zeal, par-
ticularly in matters of marriage and divorce.' Besides consolidating the
new revolutionary legal order, the French Civil Code translated into
legal prose the new revolutionary ideology of the Revolution proclaimed
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 27,
1789 and repeated in the 17 principles at the head of the Constitution of
September 3, 1791. The first three of those "natural, inalienable and
sacred" rights, i.e. "equality [before the law], liberty and property"
9. For a detailed presentation of revolutionary enactments in these fields see SL.vIN,
ATUDES SUR LES ORIGINES RtVOLUTIONNAIRES DES CODES NAPOLPON (1879).
10. Id. at 25-29. The wave of the "revolutionary spirit" in France was over. There
was internal tranquility again and time for construction of a durable civil order.
PORTALIS, DiSCOURS, RAPPORTS ET TRAVAUX INtDITS SUR LE CODE CIVIL 3-4 (1844). Com-
munist China has so far deliberately refrained from introducing a civil code because it
would be incompatible with the rapid transformation of Chinese economy and society
which is underway. Even a "revolutionary" civil code presupposes a period of relative
stability ahead.
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were the guiding principles of the Napoleonic civil legislation.1'
It is noteworthy that the revolutionary content and ideology of the
Code Napolion did not prevent it from preserving a vast treasure of the
French legal pre-revolutionary heritage (Roman jurisprudence and
French customary law as well), skillfully blending it with the new legal
order. This dual feature, part revolutionary and part traditional, did not
prove to be an obstacle to the world-wide influence exerted by the Code
NapoMon nor to its reception by a number of other nations, European
and non-European alike. Therefore, when the "revolutionary" character
of the Code Napolion is emphasized,"2 the rather restrictive meaning of
this adjective has to be kept in mind. It did not introduce, but merely
consolidated, the new revolutionary legal order. It expressed in legal
terms the ideology of the revolution. It nevertheless managed to preserve
a vast part of the legal tradition. The term "post-revolutionary" would
be equally accurate for it. As Napoleon, First Consul, put it bluntly on
December 15, 1799: "Citoyen, la Revolution . . . est finie.""
The German Civil Code of 1896 and the Swiss Civil Code of 1907
fall into a different category. Born after decades of comparative social
and political stability in a climate of confidence in steady and peaceful
progress, they fulfilled only one function in common with such revolu-
tionary codes as the French code. They unified the civil law which was
diverse in the different parts of Germany and the Swiss cantons as it
was in pre-revolutionary France. But beyond unification and the elimi-
nation of obviously obsolete law, the German and the Swiss civil codes
did not try to introduce any basic change in the established economic
and social order. On the contrary, their purpose was to preserve and to
consolidate the status quo. The attitude of the authors of the German
Civil Code was succinctly characterized by an eminent jurist, Anton
Xenger, in the following biting words: "Yes, we can be sure that
had the authors [of the code] found slavery and serfdom as binding
law in Germany, they would have carefully preserved those time-honored
11. SLvIN, op. cit. mspra note 9, at 4, 44-45, 48, 70-77. It scems significant that in
1799 Napoleon as First Consul solemnly enumerated the sacred rights which gave rise to
the Revolution in the following order: "property, equality, liberty." SOREL, INTRODUC-
TION to 1 LINva DU CENTENAIRE: LE CODE CrviL 1804-1904 at XXIV (1904). Art. I of
the omitted Livre priliminaire da Code Napolion says: "I1 existe un droit universal et
immuable, source de toutes les lois positives, il n'est que la raison naturelle en tant qu'elle
gouverne tous les hommes." This expresses well the philosophy of the Enlightenment
dominating the Code Napolion. See also PORTALiS, op. cit. suJra note 10, at 15, 306.
WEBER, LAw xN EcoN o AND SocIETY 284-294 (1954).
12. E.g., by P. I. Stuchka in BABB AND HAZARD, SovIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 17
(1957).
13. SoREL, op. cit. supra note 11, at XXIV, XXVII.
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legal institutions in their draft."' 4 Together with such a basic con-
servative attitude goes obviously a lack of any militant and dynamic
social ideology. Legal positivism, the restriction of the theory and praxis
of law to the contents of legal statutory texts and customary practices,
represents the dominant philosophy of the law during the reign of liberal
capitalism in the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
centuries."
The basically passive attitude of the drafters of revolutionary, as
well as non-revolutionary civil codes, seems to confirm Friedrich Engel's
opinion that "civil law in essence sanctions only the existing, under given
conditions, normal economic relations between individuals."'" There
cannot be any serious doubt that a civil code reflects the kind of economy
it regulates. It would be naive and unrealistic to expect to find the same
civil law provisions governing a society of independent peasants and
artisans engaged in simple commodity production, a society of laissez-
faire capitalism, an economy dominated by oligopolistic and monopolistic
concentrations of capital, and an economy based on state ownership of
the basic branches of economy and state-directed economic planning.
Engels himself realized that there existed a reciprocal influence
exerted by the law on the economic base'-a very trivial truth indeed.
Nevertheless he predicted the disappearance of civil law and law in general
and their replacement by administering of things, after the withering
away of the state when the reign of socialism had been reached. This
doctrine, strongly espoused by E. B. Pashukanis, was rejected completely
in the U.S.S.R. in the 1930's and the withering away of state and of the
law was transferred to the distant future." The same view, accepting
the compatibility of law and socialism, still prevails in the Soviet Union.'
A controversial problem discussed by Communist jurists relates to
a more special point. Can a civil code, besides its stabilizing function,
14. MENGR, DAs BORGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN 16, VI
(4th ed. 1908).
15. FRIEDMANTN, LEGAL THEORY 163-165 (3d ed. 1953).
16. ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH UND DER AUSGANG DER KLASSISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE
61 (1927).
17. Letter to Conrad Schmidt dated October 27, 1890. MARX AND ENGELS, SELECTED
CORRESPONDENCE 1846-1895 480-84 (1942).
18. Hazard, Introductiomb in BABB AND HAZARD, op. cit. szpra note 12, at XX-
XXXIV.
19. A full presentation of the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint would require a discussion
of the complex interrelations existing between at least four factors: (1) civil law, its
concepts, its system and legal doctrine on the one hand; (2) the economic life and rela-
tionships it is supposed to govern on the other as well as the relations between civil law
and economic life; (3) Marxist-Leninist long-range theory and ideology; and (4) po-
litical short-range goals toward which the ruling circles are striving at a given time. Un-
fortunately, the whole network of these interrelations cannot be entered into here.
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be used as an instrument of social change, as a tool of steering an
economy and a society in a direction desired by the legislator in accord-
ance with an ideology? If so, what kind of provisions can serve such a
dynamic purpose? The question becomes more difficult in the present
Soviet and Polish system where class struggle is a part of the past and the
state has been declared "a state of the whole people." Discrimination
along class lines can therefore no longer be used, at least officially.
Dynamic provisions of civil law must therefore be found elsewhere.
They consist in the general subordination of the civil law to political
and constitutional law and to the goals of policy established by the party
and government at a given time." Another dynamic tool of civil law
consists in the role played by the principles of socialist (or "social")
intercourse, representing socialist morality which will be discussed
below."1
THE CZECHOSLOVAK CIVIL CODE OF 1964
The Czechoslovak Civil Code has a programatic ideological pre-
amble, similar to that contained in the more important Soviet enactments,
followed by eight separately numbered principles of civil legal relations.
The eight parts of the code proper are: (1) General Provisions,
(2) Socialist Social (sic) Property and Personal Property, (3) Personal
Use of Apartments, other Premises and Lots, (4) Services, (5) Rights
and Duties arising from other Legal Transactions, (6) Liability for
Damages and for Undue Enrichment, (7) Inheritance, (8) Final Pro-
visions. The code numbers 510 sections and is therefore comparatively
short.
The matters which have been left out of its scope are as important
for an appraisal as those it deals with. Family law, in accordance with
Soviet legal doctrine accepted by all people's democracies, does not form
a part of the civil law because family relations in a socialist system are
of a personal nature, not dominated as they allegedly are in capitalist
societies by property and financial considerations. The Czechoslovak
statute on family law of December 4, 1963, goes one step further than
the R.S.F.S.R. Family Code of 1926, in transferring matrimonial
property relations from the family to the civil code."- Only the alimony
20. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE Preamble and arts. I, II, VIII (1964) ; POLISH CIVIL CODE
art. 4 (1964) ; R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE Preamble and arts. 1, 4 (19'64).
21. R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 5 (1964) refers to both the "rules of socialist inter-
course and the moral principles of society building communism." The Czechoslovak and
Polish codes do not separate those two concepts.
22. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 143-151 (joint ownership by spouses), §§ 175-178 (joint
use of apartment by spouses), §§ 214-220 (joint use of land by spouses) (1964).
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obligations connecting next of kin, spouses, and due to unmarried mothers
remained in the Czechoslovak Family Code.2"
What is more important, the new Czechoslovak Civil Code contrary
to the Soviet and Polish pattern and to section 212 of the Czechoslovak
Civil Code of 1950 leaves the area of relations between state and
cooperative enterprises and organizations in the fulfillment of economic
planning outside of its scope and restricts itself to relations between
units of the socialized economy (called "socialist organizations") and
citizens and, somewhat marginally, to the relations between citizens
themselves. Thus, the long dispute among Soviet jurists which resulted
in the rejection of a special "economic law" (Wirtschaftsrecht, as this
new branch of public law was called in Germany where the idea originated
in the early 1920's), was not considered as decisive in one of the most
obsequious of Soviet former satellites. The example of East Germany
was followed instead.24 This demonstrates that the same type of economy
is not mechanically reflected in the legal superstructure of the communist
countries but dearly leaves a choice between different solutions to the
communist legislators.
Finally, international trade relations remain outside the Czecho-
slovak Civil Code and are governed by a special act on international
commerce.25 Thus, divergent legal provisions govern, for example, a
contract of sale depending on whether it has been entered into (a) by two
socialized organizations, (b) between such an organization and a citizen,
(c) between such an organization and a foreign merchant, or (d) be-
tween two citizens. The (a) and (c) varieties no longer belong to the
domain of civil law, and (b) and (d) are different in nature ((b) not
being a contract at all) but are regulated inside the same civil code.'
Even a brief perusal of the new Czechoslovak Code gives the im-
pression that it is a remarkable legal document. The spirit permeating it
differs radically from the traditional civil law mentality, embodied in
a liberal capitalistic code of the Napoleonic type or even of a later socially
conscious, capitalistic code of the Swiss type, and which still lingers on
in the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code of 1922. There are several important in-
novations which severally and jointly create the impression of such a
new spirit.
23. Family Act §§ 85-103, December 4, 1963 [1963] Sb. No. 94.
24. Law of December 11, 1957 [1957] 1 Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik 627 (Ger. Dem. Rep.). See also LArTEv, SYSTEMA KHOZIAISTVENNYKH
DOGOVOROV v GERMANSKOI DEMOKRATICHESKOI REPUBLIKE 56-66 (1959).
25. Code on Foreign Trade, December 4, 1963, [1963] Sb. No. 101.
26. C.S.R. CivIL CODE §§ 239-256, §§ 399-406 (1964).
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NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE
A traditional continental lawyer is struck by the abandonment of
the centuries old civil law system of legal concepts and categories dating
back to Justinian's Corpts Juris elaborated in the Usus modernus Pan-
dectarum and accepted by the authors of the Code N1apolion as embodi-
ment of natural reason itself. Suffice to mention only two of them:
property and obligations (contracts).
New Concept of Personal Property. It has been correctly stated that
the Soviet-type legal system is oriented towards state and social property,
whereas the capitalist system is private-property-minded. But it has not
been stressed sufficiently that the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936 and
Soviet legislation has simply taken over the French revolutionary concept
of (private) property as an inalienable and "sacred" right and trans-
ferred it to socialist, i.e., state and social, property even with the same
"sacredness."2 The other kind of property, the personal one, was only
downgraded, devoid of sacredness, restricted as to its possible objects,
but still surrounded by constitutional guarantee' and considered as
legally separate from social property. Section 123 of the new Czecho-
slovak Civil Code provides: "Things intended for the personal need of
individual citizens shall be transferred from socialist social ownership
to the personal ownership of the individual or shall be left to them for
personal use." (Emphasis added.) Thus, personal property has become
a derivative of socialist property strictly within the limits of personal
needs it has to satisfy. The guarantee which is left applies not to personal
property as such but to the personal needs it is to satisfy."
This conclusion is strongly confirmed by section 130 (2) : "Things
accumulated contrary to the social interest in. excess of the personal needs
of the owner, his family and his household do not enjoy the protection
of personal property." (Emphasis added.) Obviously the question
whether the accumulation is excessive or not is a matter of discretion
to be decided in each case by the court or generally by an executive
ordinance of competent ministers. One is left wondering whether an
owner of two or three wristwatches or a collection of rare postage stamps
is protected under the new Czechoslovak code.
It is consistent with such a conception of personal property that its
purely consumptive character has been introduced in a specific legal
27. CONSTITUTION OF T E U.S.S.R. (1936) art. 131.
28. Co NSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. (1936) art. 10.
29. CzEcHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CONSTITUTION (1960) art. 10. C.S.R. CIVI.
CODE § 131 (1964).
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definition."0 Pursuant to section 130 (1) : "An individual shall have the
right to use a thing he owns for his own needs and for the needs of his
family and household; he shall hold title to the profits and accessions
to the thing, and shall also have the right to transfer the thing to another
person. If it is not contrary to the interests of society, the owner may let
the thing to be used by another person or dispose of it in another way."
Since personal property has to satisfy his own needs, letting it go to
someone else's use transgresses in principle the rights of the owner.
Art. 9 of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Constitution of 1960
"permits" within the limits of the socialist economic system small private
enterprises (private property) based on the labor of the owner himself
and excluding exploitation of another's labor power. The new Czecho-
slovak Civil Code relegates private property to the Final Provisions"' and
gives it protection only against illegal transgressions. Empty urban
building lots can be sold only to the state or a specially authorized socialist
organization. Private property is clearly treated as a marginal bourgeois
remnant destined to disappear in the near future.
In view of the above-mentioned radical innovations, it is not
surprising to find a more or less Soviet patterned provision that property
acquired from dishonest sources does not enjoy legal protection granted
to personal property." Since this is not a criminal but a civil rule, it opens
the door to various kinds of chicanery and irresponsible objections by
dishonest debtors. It must be stressed in this connection that the new
Czechoslovak Civil Code does not provide for the traditional Roman
protection of factual possession, whether legal or not, against unauthor-
ized unilateral transgression and self-help.3 This institution was ob-
viously considered obsolete and was replaced by a different provision
forbidding "evident violations of law violating the socialist intercourse,"3
(a double qualification). Obviously, dishonestly earned property may be
taken away from the owner by anybody with no legal remedy left to the
dispossessed.
Another less striking restriction consists in the general principle
applied to all civil rights: "No person may abuse his rights against the
interests of society or of fellow citizens nor may he enrich himself to
30. This is a departure from C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 107 (1950), R.S.F.S.R. CWvM
CODE art. 58 (1922), R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 92 (1964), and PoLIsH CIVIL CODE art.
140 (1964).
31. C.S.R. CIrVIL CODE §§ 489-492 (1964).
32. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 125(2) (1964).
33. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 150-51 (1950). C.S.R. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE (1963)
does not contain any provisions for procedure in possessory cases either.
34. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 5 (1964).
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the detriment of society or of fellow citizens.""3 Enrichment as such is
illegal, not enrichment by illegal means.
Contract Category Omitted. A real breakthrough has been achieved
by the authors of the new Czechoslovak Civil Code in abandoning the
traditional abstract heading of the law of obligations and even the
narrower one, equally abstract, of the law of contracts.
A non-jurist would wonder why a seemingly technical change such
as the rejection of an old legal category is emphasiz,2d as a breakthrough.
It must be realized that legal doctrine elaborated by learned jurists during
centuries and reflected in statutes and codes as well as in court judgments
has as much political and ideological significance as have doctrines and
schools of thought in the science of economics. It is quite superfluous
to try to elaborate what kind of political and philosophical attitude is
represented by the Manchester school of economic liberalism. The
ideological and political differences separating different schools of legal
thinking and systems are much less known to the general public, but are
not less real. The only difference was that until now there was no real
counterpart in civil law to the school of Marxist economics. The concepts
and categories of the advanced capitalist legal systems were taken over,
more or less modified, and allowed to perform an allegedly completely
different legal function inside the socialized economy. The Czechoslovak
Civil Code tries to create a new socialist legal system. Contrary to other
communist civil codes,36 including the recent Polish" and R.S.F.S.R."8
codes of 1964, the new Czechoslovak code introduces two novel legal
categories covering in an unorthodox spirit much of the old traditional
ground.
Services. First comes the category of services. This concerns rela-
tions between socialist organizations and citizens. The former are
obligated to satisfy the material and cultural needs of the latter. For
example, the commercial purchase and sale39 of mcrchandise in a social-
ized store by a private citizen, the renting of a hotel room, a loan of a
sum of money by a bank to a citizen, legal advice and aid of an attorney-
at-law, a railway trip, insurance of property, life insurance and civil
liability insurance are, according to the Czechoslovak Civil Code, neither
35. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. VII (1964).
36. In R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE (1922) arts. 106-415 are grouped under the heading
"Law of Obligations" and C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 211-58 (1950) were headed in the same
way. The BuLGAIAN LAw OF OBLIGATIONS (1951) appeared as a separate statute and
the HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE arts. 198-597 (1959) are listed under the "Law of Obliga-
tions."
37. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 353-921 (1964).
38. R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CoDE arts. 158-474 (1964).
39. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 239-56 (1964).
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contracts nor quasi-contracts," but services. Therefore, the overriding
consideration in all these relationships is the orderly, timely and con-
tinuous satisfaction of the needs of the citizen41 with his cooperation
when needed." Services are rendered as a rule for a price paid by the
citizen.4" The traditional approach which asks whether the provisions
of a contract agreed upon by the parties have been complied with is re-
stricted to details which the code expressly leaves for contractual
agreement.44
The traditional Western principle of freedom of contract has been
explicitly rejected. "If the duties of an organization include the provision
of a service, the organization shall have the duty to provide it at the
request of an individual unless it is precluded by the scope of its oper-
ational possibilities.
' 45
It is important to emphasize in this connection that the Czechoslovak
Civil Code has gone far down the road of rejecting traditional abstract
legal concepts, categories, and provisions which bring under one abstract
heading legal transactions and institutions notwithstanding their impor-
tant economic and social differences. The new Czechoslovak legislation
sacrificed with ruthless consistency the traditional Western scholarly
legal doctrine and favors the creation of special legal provisions for each
field of significantly different social and economic relations. Instead of
the traditional law of contracts (with the continental sub-species of com-
mercial law contracts) covering the whole area of commodity turnover,
domestic and foreign, irrespective of persons involved, the Czechoslovak
civil legislation introduced four different legal regulations: (1) for
foreign trade,48 (2) for transactions between socialized organizations
pursuant to the economic plan,47 (3) for socialized organizations in their
40. Services may originate from contractual basis "or on the basis of other facts
stipulated by legal regulations." C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 224(1) (1964). Transportation of
persons and goods by railroad and other carriers is a right which does not require any
contract. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 307, 312 (1964). The same applies to the purchase of
things from a trade organization which is obliged to sell selected merchandise. No con-
tract is involved. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 239 (1964).
41. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 223, 226, 233 (1964).
42. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 227 (1964).
43. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 225, 229-32 (1964).
44. This view is not based on a specific provision of the code and is therefore open
to challenge. However, it seems to follow from the new conception of services to the
citizens by socialized organizations created for these purposes. Contracts are only a
means to the end of satisfying the needs of the citizen. Therefore, the respective provi-
sions of the code must be considered as ins cogens unless they clearly permit otherwise.
This is an exact reversal of traditional contract law.
45. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 224(2) (1964).
46. C.S.R. CODE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1963).
47. C.S.R. EcoNolic CODE (1964).
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relationships with private citizens,4" and (4) transactions between private
citizens." Each legislation deals with purchase and sale or loan, but each
in a different way. There is no trace of the effort so evident in the new
Polish Civil Code of 1964 to preserve the unity of the traditional system
and institutions and to accommodate the inescapable differences and
deviations within the old system.
Civic (Mutud) Assistance. Another original category was introduced
in the area of relations among the private citizens themselves. It is
called civic (citizens) assistance."0 It resembles extra-legal, customary
good-neighborly assistance as it is understood in American frontier
conditions. Section 384 says: "(1) When a citizen performs some work
for another citizen on his request or loans him money or helps him in
another manner civic assistance is given. (2) Tlie rendering of civic
assistance shall be in accordance with the principles of socialist inter-
course." Such assistance is as a rule to be given free. Quite consistently,
a loan granted by one citizen to another has to be free of interest unless
otherwise specifically agreed upon and naturally not exceeding the legal
interest rate. Any other advantage is null and void."' Thus, a socialist
economy returns to the oldest Roman law of the classical period where
1inutum (money loan for consumption) was interest-free, a sign of a
rural pre-commercial primitive commodity economy, and interest had to
be specifically stipulated outside the mutuum transaction. 2 Purchase and
sale between citizens, donation and mandate," are not considered as fall-
ing within the civic (mutual) assistance category. They are, however,
clearly treated in a perfunctory manner as marginal phenomena not
worthy of serious attention by the legislator in a socialist state.
Duty to Prevent Injury and Damage. The Czechoslovak Civil Code
introduces a new sweeping civil law obligation to prevent injury to
health or property and undue material gain detrimental to society or
an individual. 4 This duty is imposed on "everybody" and consists of
the obligation of notifying the competent governmental organ about
serious imminent danger and of intervening actively if an emergency
situation arises. Only when weighty circumstances prevent intervention,
or, if by intervening one would expose himself or another person closely
48. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 222-383 (1964).
49. C.S.R. CIvIL CODE 88 384-411 (1964).
50. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE 384-389 (1964) (civic aid).
51. Ibid. If things in kind were loaned, only the same amount has to be returned.
A promise to return more is invalid. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 388 (1964).
52. BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 591 (1953).
53. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 399-411 (1964).
54. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 415 (1964).
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connected with him to serious danger, does the duty to intervene cease."5
There are certain privileges granted to those who intervene to prevent
damage. They are, as a rule, not liable for damage which results from
their intervention and they may claim the reimbursement of expenses
incurred and indemnification of damage they suffer.56 There is a specific
civil sanction attached. He who fails to prevent damage by intervening
may be required by a court to contribute to the compensation of damages
to an extent determined by the circumstances, if damages cannot otherwise
be recovered.5" In other words, the passive onlooker may be held re-
sponsible for damages as a substitute for the actual wrongdoer. The
authors of the Czechoslovak code went much farther here than the new
Polish Civil Code which introduces only a duty to prevent damage to
social property58 with some privileges but without any civil sanction.
The Czechoslovak code incorporates the same idea of prevention in
connection with contracts. The contracting parties are obliged when
drafting their contractual relations to avoid anything which could lead
to a controversy. 9 Law suits must be prevented at their very source.
This new broad policy of legal prevention (somewhat similar to
preventive medicine) has three significant features: first, it explicitly
stipulates a civil law duty to rescue not only human life'0 but more
broadly to prevent any injury to human health, thus supplementing the
criminal provisions demanding rescue in cases where life is in instant
danger.6 Now, civil liability for failure to attempt rescue exists beyond
any doubt and claims are clearly encouraged in Czechoslovakia; secondly,
every kind of property, not only social property, enjoys preventive pro-
tection by the obligatory intervention of outsiders and onlookers; finally,
prevention is directed not only against injuries and damages but equally
against unwarranted gains.
The treatment of unwarranted gain represents another highlight
of the Czechoslovak Civil Code. Part VI deals with "liability for damage
and for unwarranted material gain." Coupling together these tradition-
55. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 416 (1964).
56. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 418-19 (1964).
57. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 425 (1964).
58. POLISH CIvIL CODE art. 127 (1964).
59. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 43 (1964).
60. Hazard, Soziet Socialism and the Duty to Rescue, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARA-
TIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 160-171 (1961).
61. E.g., DUTCH CRIMINAL CODE art. 450 (1886); ITALIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 593
(1930); POLISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 247 (1932) ; GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE § 330 c (1953) ;
C.S.R. CRIMINAL CODE § 227 (1950); and HUNGARIAN CRIMINAL CODE § 259 (1961).
The question whether a criminal provision punishing certain actions necessarily implies
that they should be considered torts creating civil liability was discussed in a plenary
resolution of the Civil Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, October 26, 1956, Co. 31/56,
Zb. Urz. 1958 poz. 1.
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ally separate grounds of liability creates a new legal concept. 2 This
merging was greatly facilitated by Czechoslovak acceptance of the Soviet
principle that liability for damage is not based on fault63 and by the
above-stressed new principle that enrichment per se is illegal.
The authors of the Czechoslovak code went much further in pressing
this new legal conception. In an introductory chapter of Part VI "the
duty of every citizen to intervene in order to avert immediately threaten-
ing damage to health or property" is twice put on the same level of a
corresponding duty of every citizen to prevent a threatening (sic) im-
portant unwarranted (material) gain. 4 With a ruthless doctrinaire
consistency and an obvious lack of humor the authors of the Czecho-
slovak code treat a windfall about to accrue without legal foundation to
a socialist organization or to an individual" on a par with a catastrophic
explosion or collision of two passenger trains or airplanes. It remains
unclear what (if any) civil sanction arises from a failure to prevent an
impending unfounded gain. Does the "culprit" (like he who failed to
prevent damage) 8 have to contribute to the repayment of the unfounded
gain by the enriched organization or person ?
It seems noteworthy that the new code grants compensation for
actual losses suffered (damnium entergens), not for gain lost (lucrum
cessans). If damage was deliberately inflicted, the court may grant
other damages, if a refusal to grant such larger compensation would be
contrary to the principles of socialist intercourse."8 It is not clear why
Poland which is comparatively poor economically should grant tradi-
tional full compensation while much wealthier Czechoslovakia restricts
compensation in such a drastic manner.
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST INTERCOURSE
One of the basic principles preceding the nev Czechoslovak code
reads: "The realization of rights and duties flowing from civic legal
relations has to be in harmony with the principles of socialist inter-
62. Torts are separated from undue enrichment in PoLISr CIVIL CODE arts. 415-49,
405-14 (1964). It is interesting that the Czechoslovak code expands the category of un-
due enrichment which is traditionally residual in nature into a larger one embracing not
only gain acquired without legal ground, gain derived from imalid transactions and dis-
honest sources, but also from the appropriation of an object found by a person as well as
the benefit to a person from the fact that somebody else performed what he himself was
obliged to do. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §3 452-454 (1964).
63. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 420(1) ; R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 444 (1964).
64. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 415-6 (1964).
65. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 415 (1964).
66. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 425 (1964).
67. Analogy from C.S.R. CIVIL CODE §§ 425, 451, 456 (1964).
68. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 442 (1964).
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course."69 The same principle is repeated in connection with the new
category of civic (mutual) assistance." Thus, principles of Marxist
morality have been on the Soviet model," set over and above the pro-
visions of civil law restricting and modifying its application. It remains
for the courts to decide whether those principles of socialist intercourse
should be construed as referring to values and standards generally ac-
cepted by the population-a solution traditionally prevalent in Western
countries and reflected by the Roman notion of boni mores-or whether
they refer to values and standards preached and demanded by Marxist
doctrine and not shared by the wide majority of society. In the latter
case the code acquires a revolutionary dynamic character as a weapon
to impose forcibly from above a new set of values and standards and
ways of behavior and to eradicate old moral appraisals branded as
bourgeois and reactionary. A new ideology stands behind and above the
provisions of the code.
CONCLUSION
Only the most striking features of the new Czechoslovak code have
been touched. Its style is rather didactic, as a rule clear and concise,
combining legal regulation with a kind of a textbook exposition.
Summing up, this new piece of civil legislation must be considered as
a truly revolutionary civil code, even more revolutionary (in a specific
sense) than the French Code Napolgon was in its time. The latter con-
solidated the gains achieved by the French Revolution, at the same time
incorporating them in the traditional legal system of Justinian's Corpus
Juris and the usus modernus Pandectarum. The new Czechoslovak Civil
Code rejects traditional Western civil law doctrine, explodes its cate-
gories of the law of obligations and law of contracts, introduces its own
categories such as services and civic (mutual) assistance, and deprives
certain everyday transactions of their contractual character. These
changes transcend by far the purely technical legal field. They introduce
a new spirit, a new application of law. They have profound political
eloquence and importance as well. To put it crudely in Marxist terms:
the superstructure has changed. There is no longer the same legal
form borrowed from the capitalist world but covering a different socialist
content. Now there is a new socialist form as well.
The very idea of contract has been replaced by the idea of public
69. C.S.R. CIviL CODE Preamble art. VI (1964). There was no such provision in
the 1950 code.
70. C.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 384(2) (1964).
71. CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. (1936) art. 130; R.S.F.S.R. CVM CODE art. 5
(1964).
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service. Contract where still needed has been downgraded to a means to
an end, the end being a duty to render public service. This duty is
paramount, and a contract must be concluded which is fit to achieve
that purpose. It has an ancillary role analogous to an obligatory contract
between socialized enterprises in the fulfillment of the national economic
plan. The evolution of legal institutions from status to contract, de-
scribed in 1861 by Sir Henry Sumner Maine,"2 followed during the
second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries by limita-
tions of the freedom of contract through social and labor unions, legisla-
tion and standardization of contracts (in transport, insurance, mortgage
and landlord and tenant contracts, and sale of mass manufactured
goods)7 has finally resulted in the dethroning of the concept of con-
tract and its total elimination in retail trade and transport.
THE POLISH CIVIL CODE OF 1964
In contrast to the Czechoslovak Civil Code, a much more moderate
and rather stabilizing than dynamic spirit is evident in the new Polish
Civil Code. After an almost uninterrupted preparatory drafting since
1947,"' and the publication of at least six markedly divergent versions,"'
the Polish Sejm (parliament) adopted on April 23, 1964, a new civil
code, the first Polish code since Poland regained independence in 1918.16
Contrary to the Czechoslovak code, the new Polish code follows the
traditional Western pattern. It contains four "books": I. General Part,
II. Property and other rights in re, III. Obligations, and IV. Inheritance
(Estates). The major deviation from Western tradition is the exclusion
72. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SocIETY
AND ITS RELATIONS TO MODERN IDEAS 141 (1946).
73. FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 145, 480.
74. The first draft was published in the Demokratycznv Przeglad Prawniczy be-
tween December 1947 and March 1949. Wolter, Nowy projek, kodeks, cywilnego, P. i
Pr., Feb. 1962, p. 210.
75. Some of them were in book form. The 1954 and 1955 heavily Soviet-modeled
drafts were abandoned after the 1956 upheavals. A ne\y draft appeared in 1960 ac-
cepted in first reading by a panel on Civil Substantive Law of the Codification Commis-
sion. It included family law and represented a politically signiicant return to traditional
Western solutions. Then the wave of national Polish renaissarce began to recede before
the returning tide of Marxist-Communist orthodoxy. The chairman of the panel, Marow-
ski, retired from the commission and Szer, a neo-Stalinist took over. In 1961 and final
1962 drafts no longer contained family law. Indications were that the inclusion of family
law was regarded as a breach of solidarity of the "socialist" camp, thus it was a political-
ideological and not a purely legal matter.
76. Several civil law fields were codified in Poland in the inter-war period. The
POLISH CODE OF OBLIGATIONS (1933), and POLISH CODE OF COMMERCE (1934) were the
important ones. The post-World War II unification decrees left both pre-war codes in
force. See Rudzinski, Sovietization of Civil Law in Poland, A:IERICAN SLAVIC AND EAST
EUROPEAN REv., April 1956, p. 216.
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of family law, which was separately enacted as a statute on February
25, 1964."
The Polish code is much larger than the Czechoslovak code and is a
more detailed piece of legal craftsmanship, running up to 1088 articles,
not counting a separate statute of the same date containing introductory
provisions in 45 articles." There is no introductory ideological preamble
and the text is free from pseudo-theoretical and didactic or hortatory
language. It adheres strictly to the old Roman principle: lex imperat non
disputat.
In a crass contradiction to the Czechoslovak code, a strong effort is
evident throughout the Polish code to preserve and maintain the integrity
and unity of civil law inside its new confines (after family law has been
left out), not merely in the purely scholarly sense, as an academic teach-
ing subject or in juridical textbooks, but as a branch of legislation as well.
Civil law has to cover and regulate in a single code all forms of property
and all commodity-money relations entered into on the basis of legal
equality of the parties. The reason for such unity is to be found, accord-
ing to one of the principal authors of the new code, Professor Jan
Wasilkowski, First President of the Supreme Court, in the economic
base which forms an indivisible whole.7" This argument, if true, proves
too much. The exclusion of a number of areas from the new Polish Civil
Code whose civil law character remains beyond dispute would become
inexplicable. The laws on estate records and mortgages, copyright and
patents, bills of exchange and checks, to mention only the most important
ones, were deliberately excluded from the new code, mainly for reasons
of drafting expediency."0 Whether the economic base is an indivisible
whole is beside the point. It certainly is not homogeneous, and it permits
the legislator a choice between regulating different sectors separately or
introducing uniform regulations covering all or some of them. The
Polish drafters, following halfway the Soviet model, chose the latter
solution.
HIERARCHY AND COEXISTENCE OF THREE KINDS OF PROPERTY
Contrary to the rigid and ruthlessly consistent Czechoslovak treat-
ment of personal property as derivatives of social property transferred
and left to personal consumption within the limits of personal needs
77. Dz. U. No. 9 poz. 59.
78. Dz. U. No. 16 poz. 94.
79. Wasilkowski, Metoda opracowania i salozenia kodeksu cywilnego, P. i Pr., May-
June 1964, p. 738-39.
80. PROJEKT KODEKSU CYWILNEGO RAZ PRZEPISOW WPROWADZAJACYCH KODEKS
cYWILNY, KOMISJA KODYFIKACYJNA PRZY MINISTRZE SPRAWVIEDLIWOSCI 195 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as PROJEKT].
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and as long as actually needed, the Polish code openly preaches a rather
static somewhat Aristotelian hierarchy and coexisten.ce of three kinds of
property.
Social Property. Social property is proclaimed as the dominant
kind,"' and is endowed with a great number of legal privileges in the
new code. Social property itself is divided into two legally unequal sub-
categories: (a) state (i.e., national) property and (b) cooperative prop-
erty and property of agricultural circles and of other organizations of
the working people."2 While both of these subspecies of social property
enjoy the privilege that every citizen is legally obliged to protect them
from threatening damage, 3 and that all the provisions of the civil code
have to be construed and applied with due consideration of the special
protection granted by law to social property,"4 state property is "more
equal" than cooperative property and endowed with several additional
privileges of its own. State-owned real estate cannot be acquired by
usucaption.5' The construction of a building on a state-owned lot by a
citizen does not result in the acquisition of the lot by the builder.8"
Movables forming part of the permanent (capital) equipment of a state
enterprise or institution can be vindicated when sold even from a bona
fide purchaser."7 There is no statute of limitations for a vindication
claim concerning state-owned movables against citizens and private
associations.8 The state, being at the same time owner of property and
sovereign, often appears in the civil code under the traditional Roman
civil law disguise as the Treasury (Skarb Pafistwa) or under a new term
of a "state organization unit" (pafistwowa jednostka organizacyjna)
covering state enterprises, banks, institutions, and other state units having
the legal character of juridical personality."8 The equality of persons
before the law, on which traditional civil law is based and which is
still stressed by Polish drafters of the new code,"0 has been actually
changed into a hierarchy of several degrees. What the code still tries
to preserve is not equality before the law, but in the field of civil law the
81. PoLI H CONSTITUTION (1952) arts. 3, 77. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 126-9 (1964).
82. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 33, 44, 126 (1964).
83. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 127 (1964).
84. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 129 (1964).
85. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 177 (1964).
86. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 231(3) (1964).
87. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 171 (1964).
88. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 223(2) (1964).
89. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 33 (1964). The term "state organization unit" is to be
distinguished from "unit of socialized economy" (jednostka gospodarld uspolecznionej)
which is broader and covers cooperatives, rural circles and othcr social organizations of
working people having a legal personality. POLISH CIVIL CoDE art. 33 (1964). See
WOLTER, PRAWO CYWILNE ZARYS CZESCI OGOLNEJ 167-80 (1963).
90. Wasilkowski, op. cit. supra note 79 at 739.
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prevention of the subjection of one civil law person to the public authority
and power (imperium) of the other.
Personal Property. At a lower level we find personal property. It
enjoys not "special" but "complete" protection of the law.9 Its purpose
to satisfy the personal material and cultural needs of the owner and
persons next to him (bliskich) is clearly stated, 2 but its derivative
character in relation to social property or to work as its source is not
mentioned at all. Nor is there any general quantitative maximum
stipulated a la Czech, beyond which legal protection is withdrawn when
more property is accumulated, with one exception flowing from the
consumption character of personal property. A one-family house, an
apartment (lokal mieszkaniowy-legally an immovable) must remain
within certain limits of size prescribed by pertinent regulations. But
they can for good reasons be leased by the owner to third persons without
losing the character and protection of personal property.93
Private Property. On a still lower level resides individual (private)
property of land, buildings, and other means of production which are
not affected by social monopoly of ownership. This category also is split
into two subspecies: (a) individual farms of working peasants enjoying
simply "protection" (opieka, care without any adjective) of the law"
and (b) individual property of a capitalist character, i.e., using hired
labor or urban lots and buildings which exists only on the basis and within
the limits of statutes in force without any constitutional guarantee.9"
The descending degree of legal protection means more than a kind of
constitutional guarantee which would be of doubtful value because of the
usual European lack of judicial review of constitutionality of statutes
enacted by the legislature. It means first of all a directive addressed to
the courts and to administrative authorities to attach proper value to
and take care not to violate in their judgments and decisions the rights
of all three kinds of "protected" ownership. Judging from the grounds
often adduced in court judgments, this directive is being kept in mind
by the courts. Politically significant changes and shifts in judicial
91. POLISH CONSTITUTION (1952) art. 13. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 139 (1964).
92. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 132 (1964).
93. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 132-8 (1964).
94. POLISH CONSTITUTION (1952) art. 12; POLISH CIVL CODE art. 131 (1964). It
is significant that the code fails to repeat the protection granted by art. 12 of the Con-
stitution to individual property owned by artisans. The legal status of their property re-
mains precarious. Another sign may be the omission from the code of a routine provi-
sion of the 1962 draft concerning a two year statute of limitations of claims of craftsmen.
PROJExcT art. 698 (1962).
95. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 30 (1964). Wholesale expropriation of individual non-
peasant property by a simple statute would not be unconstitutional.
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practice can be noted in cases where protection of social property rights
collides with the protection of personal or private property.
Thus a kind of coexistence between the three main categories was
established with two of them subdivided. In all, there are five kinds of
property descending downward in amount of legal protection and
privilege. All of them (with the probable exception of the fifth species,
i.e., the non-peasant, capitalist type of private property) are obviously
intended to remain for a long time. There is no hint of a drive or
attempt to bring peasant private property to an end. On the contrary,
a recent (1963) statute introducing limitations of the division of peasant
farms,"0 tried to halt or to slow down the atomization of peasant farms
by sale, donation or inheritance. It has been incorporated into the new
Polish Civil Code,97 making it quasi-permanent legislation. A policy
to collectivize peasant farming into kolkhozes would repose on the
atomization of farms as a splendid justification.
PEASANT PROPERTY CLASS LEGISLATION
There is a peculiar, very paradoxical feature evident in this recent
Polish peasant farm legislation. It has undoubtedly a class character,
but not a proletarian one. It is intended to further the class interest of
the independent, land-owning middle and small peasantry to such an
extent that it clearly discriminates against industrial workers, even if they
happen to be sons of peasants. Private peasant land property in Poland
enjoys special privileges very different politically and ideologically from
those connected with state and co-operative property.
First, only persons having qualifications to run a farm properly
and efficiently may buy a peasant farm.98 Furthermore, as will be seen
below, such a farm may be transferred through inheritance virtually
only to persons who have the required qualifications to run a farm. 9
In other words, non-farmers are not entitled to own peasant farms nor
to inherit them.
UNIFOR-M BUT PARTLY SPLIT CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
In spite of the above-described differentiation of property into five
hierarchically arranged categories, the Polish Civil Code retains a
uniform legal cozcept of property in general embracing them all and a
host of general provisions concerning the contents and exercise of the
right of property, transfer of property, usucaption, other means of ac-
96. Law of June 29, 1963, Dz. U. No. 28 poz. 168.
97. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 163-7, 1058-88 (1964).
98. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 160(1) (1964).
99. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 1059-62, 1065, 1067, 1069, 1071 (1964).
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quiring and losing property, joint property, and protection of property.0 0
The traditional Roman definition of the content of the right of property
has been changed. The new definition authorizes the owner to use the
property-excluding other persons-in accordance with the social-
economic destination within limits prescribed by statutes and the prin-
ciples of social intercourse-and in particular to take profits and other
income from the property.'' The absolute character of private property
proclaimed by the Code Napoleon," 2 abandoned by later capitalist codes,
has not been replaced in this general definition by the historic feudal
germanistic conception, on including social obligations into its notion. 3
Statutes and principles of social intercourse act as limitations only, and
so acts also the social economic purpose of the right of ownership. A
significant change was introduced, however. Socialist ethics limit the
exercise of the right of property on a par with statutory restrictions.
But having established the common core, the uniform concept of
ownership splits nevertheless into two different ones. State property
contains inherent duties. Art. 141 provides that persons to whom man-
agement of separated portions of national property has been entrusted
are duty bound to conduct their management in a way which assures
the best possible fulfillment of tasks which were the basis for entrusting
management to them. 4 It is surprising and difficult to explain why
co-operative property should be exempted from this inherent obligation.
A duty under public law to exploit properly social property seems evident.
However, in view of the clear but permissive liberal language of Art. 140,
specifying the contents of all kinds of ownership, it will be difficult for
Polish courts to construe the criterion of "socio-economic destination" as
imposing on the owner of personal and private property a duty to make
use of his right in the proper direction.' °
UNITY OF STATE PROPERTY
The Polish legislators preserved the principle of unity (indivisi-
bility) of state property.'0 6 State enterprises and other state legal persons
receive parts of state property for managenent and exercise rights de-
rived from state ownership within the limits of their legal capacity in
their own name.
100. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 140-54, 155-71, 172-8, 179-94, 195-221, 222-31 (1964).
101. PoLIsH CIVIL CODE art. 140 (1964).
102. FRENcH CIVIL CODE art. 544: "la maniere ]a plus absolue."
103. GERMAN WEIMAR CONSTITUTION (1919) art. 153: "Eigentum verpflichtet.
Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich Dienst sein fUr das Gemeine Beste."
104. POLIsH CIVIL CODE art. 141 (1964).
105. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 224 (1964) exempting a bona fide independent posses-
sor from any liability for deterioration or loss of property supports this view.
106. POLISH CiviL. CODE art. 128(1) (1964).
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The principle of indivisible state ownership is said to reflect in the
legal superstructure the unity of the political power of the socialist state
and the "democratic centralism" of its structure which enables the state
to guide the economy through state-wide economic planning. The in-
divisibility of state ownership enables also proper distribution and re-
distribution of means of production among the producing units. The
rejection of this unity of state ownership would lead to granting to the
enterprises themselves full ownership rights, thus creating a kind of
group ownership by a group of undefined composition. Such a result
would raise, it is stressed, basic social and political objections."' 8
The Yugoslav version of socialism has been disregarded. Means of
production there are owned not by the state as a political organization
and not by the workers, but somewhat vaguely by society as a whole." 9
Such a "revisionist" legal conception obviously transcends the realm of
purely legal technicalities. It avoids the orthodox Soviet-type exaggera-
tion and supremacy of the state both as sovereign and as manager of
the economy and by distinguishing between these two functions fits
better into a civil lay system.
EFFORT TO PRESERVE UNIFORm-% LAW FOR ALL SECTORS OF ECONOMY
The same tendency to preserve as far as possible uniform and
general legal regulation and traditional legal concepts is evident in the
field of obligations. Book III (by far the largest in the code),"' dealing
with this subject, embraces all four areas of the exchange of goods and
services (1) between the units of socialized econory themselves in the
fulfillment of the national economic plan, (2) between citizens and units
of socialized economy, (3) between citizens themselves, and (4) between
the state and foreign countries. The Czechoslovak Civil Code covers
only areas (2) and (3) and treats them in a fundamentally different
manner.
In the Polish code, for all its efforts at uniformity in the general
part,"' as well as in the provisions pertaining to specific types of con-
tracts, the uniform picture is constantly marred by repeated introduction
of special provisions concerning relations between units of socialized
economy themselves or relations between the latter and private citizens.
107. Pous, CrwL CODE arts. 128(2), 535(2) (1964). "Exclusive disposition" not
ownership is transferred by sale from one state unit to another.
108. Wasilkowski, supra note 79, at 741.
109. BLAGOJEVIC, SOME CHARACTERISTIC PRivATE LAW I-;STITUTIONS IN THE SO-
CIALIST COUNTRIES 12 (1964).
110. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 353-921 (1964).
111. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 353-65, 366-83, 384-396, 405-14, 415-49, 450-597, 498-
508, 509-526, 527-34 (1964).
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SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR SOCIAL ECONOMY
These special provisions can be roughly divided into (1) special
principles and special institutions concerning socialized economy only,
(2) a stricter discipline prescribed for social economy, and (3) privileges
enjoyed by units of socialized economy or by the state as such.
The state-wide economic plan, representing the foundation of the
exchange of goods and services between units of socialized economy," 2
had to be reconciled with the rejection of a special economic law and
the adoption of a regime of contractual relations between and strict
financial accounting of those units. As a consequence, the traditional
freedom of contract had to be rejected in their interrelations and sub-
stituted, Soviet style, by a legal duty to enter into contracts.
Obligation to contract. This duty may be incumbent upon both
sides of the required contract." 3 It thus differs from the Western style
contracts of adhesion of public utilities where only the latter are duty-
bound to contract with a member of the public. A special chapter deals
with "Obligation to conclude contracts between units of socialized
economy.""' 4 The contracts concerned may be purchase and sale, a con-
tract of supply of goods to be produced (dostawa) or contracts concern-
ing other performance. This institution does not differ substantially
from its Soviet prototype. The relationship of both parties obliged to
conclude a contract is regulated in terms of civil law, including an offer,
its possible rejection, and a "pre-contract litigation."
Special institutions restricted to social economy. There are three
special institutions restricted to the field of socialized economy only:
A. "'Perpetual usufruct" may be established by contract only on
state-owned urban lots on behalf of private persons, apartment construc-
tion cooperatives, and other juridical persons. Contrary to its name, it
represents a time-limited kind of ownership of buildings to be constructed
on state property lasting as a rule for 99 years. A compensation has to
be paid to the user for the buildings at the expiration of his right."'
B. Contract of supply of (industrial) goods determined in kind
and to be produced and delivered in batches or periodically, may be
concluded only between two units of socialized economy. The recipient
112. POLISH CIvIL CODE arts. 386, 141 (1964). The criterion for "social-economic
destination" governing the exercise of all civil rights (art. 5) and property in particular
(art. 140) is here being construed not as a general purpose, intrinsic in the given kind
of object, e.g., bread for eating, but concretely as a goal determined by the current na-
tional economic plan. Wasilkowski, supra note 79, at 741.
113. PoLISH CiviL CODE art. 401 (1964).
114. POLIs H CiviL CODE art. 397-404 (1964).
115. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 232-43 (1964).
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(creditor) for whom the goods are being produced has the right to
inspect the supplying factory. The supplier's liability for defects of
goods produced by him exceeds the limits of a sellcr's warranty.1 '
C. Contract concerning construction work is also restricted to
units of socialized economy on both sides. The unit on whose terrain the
construction has to be built has to conduct the preparatory work and
provide a detailed technical blueprint. The contract itself may be con-
tingent on the opening of financial bank credit.1
A further special feature distinguishing socialized economy consists
in the authorization of the Council of Ministers or, if empowered by it,
of a Ministry to issue for specified categories of contracts general con-
ditions or standard contracts betveen units of socialized economy and
between such units and other persons. Such stand:ard contracts may be
invested with the force of ius cogens, depriving the parties of the right
to enter into a contract on other than the standard terms. 18
A simple consequence of the retention of a sole title-owner of state
property, i.e., the state itself, may be found in the provision that a con-
tract of sale between state organizational units does not transfer owner-
ship of goods sold but only "exclusive management and disposition."
Thus, a sale contract is concluded between two state juridical persons,
none of them owning the goods sold and purchased, both legally obliged
to enter into the contract and leaving intact and unchanged the ownership
of the goods sold even after they have changed hands. Such a contract
comes quite near to being an agreement negotiated by a person with
himself under duress, something clearly unthinkable under traditional
Western civil law doctrine.
Art. 2 of the new Polish code provides that transactions between
units of the socialized economy, when their special needs so require, may
be regulated by the Council of M\Iinisters or any other supreme govern-
mental organ authorized by it-in a manner dif fering from the pro-
visions of the civil code."' Thus, the whole multitude of special pro-
visions governing planned economy remain in for,.!20 and the civil code
is relegated to a subsidiary role to be enforced only in the absence of
116. POLISH Civr, CODE- arts. 605-12 (1964).
117. POLISH CivrL CODE art. 647-58 (1964).
118. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 384 (1964).
119. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 2 (1964).
120. Art. IX, Introductory Provision of April 23, 1964, Dz. U. No. 16 poz. 94. A
special resolution of the Seim requested the government to bring the special regulations
into harmony with the civil code in two years unless the specitic needs of socialist turn-
over require their further retention. Vasilkowsld, Uchwolenie kodeksu cywilnego,
Nowe Prawo, June 1964, p. 581.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ad hoc special ordinances. The uniformity of civil law has been thus
preserved more in principle than in fact.
STRICTER DISCIPLINE
A second distinguishing feature consists in some special provisions
imposing stricter and more exacting discipline on the socialized sector
than the more lenient regime for the same categories of contracts when
entered into by private persons. The statute of limitations affecting
claims of one -unit of socialized economy against another results in
complete extinction of the claim.121 The time limit for such extinction
is only one year for units of social economy inter se and much longer
(ten years as a rule and three years for periodic benefits) for other
relations. 2 The flow of this one-year time limit is not liable to interrup-
tion by an act of acknowledgment of the claim by the debtor social unit
when another social unit is the creditor.'23
When sale of goods has been contracted between socialized units,
a later enacted price ceiling, price floor, or a fixed price has retroactive
force,2 4 and the liability warranty of the seller for defects of the goods
sold cannot be restricted or eliminated by contract. 5 Similarly, some
other rights of the creditor social unit are greater and some duties of
such debtor unit more extensive during the performance of all types
of contracts among them.'26
PRIVILEGES OF SOCIAL UNITS
As if to counterbalance the rigors imposed on units of socialized
economy, the new Polish code grants them some significant privileges,
putting them apart from private citizens and their associations. Inside
the socialized economy a gradation is introduced again. Some privileges
are granted (1) to all units of social economy, others (2) to state units
alone.
The most important general privileges are the following. A higher
than usual standard of due diligence is required from every debtor if the
obligation refers to social property. 2 In relations between social units
the buyer has the right to withdraw unilaterally from a sales contract for
121. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 117(2) (1964). In other relations the debtor may re-
nounce his right to invoke the statute of limitations.
122. PoLIsH CIVIL CODE art. 118 (1964).
123. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 123(2) (1964).
124. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 54(1) (1964).
125. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 558(1), 563(2), 569 (1964) introduce stricter require-
ments of this seller's guarantee for social units only.
126. PoLIs~r CIVIL CODE arts. 456, 489 (1964).
127. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 355 (1964).
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important reasons upon payment of damages to the seller.' A socialized
unit financing an installment sale by another social unit enjoys a
statutory lien on the goods sold as long as they remain in the purchaser's
possession."'
More numerous are privileges granted exclusively to state units.
The right of retention of a movable (until the outlay spent on it or the
damage it had inflicted are paid or secured) does not exist in relation
to a state organization unit.' A rather odd consequence may result
from the provision denying to a possessor of a plot of land the right to
seize an animal that happens to be state-owned. 3' A kolkhoz-owned horse
or cow however may apparently be seized. The farmer is evidently
supposed to be able to recognize a state cow when he sees one. Similarly,
the code excludes the routine statutory lien on movables resulting from
a lease of office or commercial or industrial space,"3 2 the same lien in
connection with an agency (brokerage) contract, 3' a commission
(factor) contract, 3" a transportation of goods (carrier) contract, 3 ' a
forwarding contract," 6 and a contract of storing of merchandise (ware-
house.) 3
In relation to peasant farms, the code grants the Treasury a statu-
tory pre-emption right relating to them in case of division of joint owner-
ship of them through sale on auction38 and in analogous cases of division
of an estate containing a peasant farm. 9
A somewhat different significance than just a state privilege must
be attributed to the provision making all donations to non-state organiza-
tional units (therefore also to co-operatives and non-social associations
and institutions, but obviously not to individuals) contingent on the
permission of a competent state organ.' 0 This restriction, creating by
inference a privilege for donations to the state, covers movables as well
as real estate. As a consequence, even a transfer of ownership of a rural
128. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 553 (1964).
129. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 588 (1964).
130. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 461(3) (1964).
131. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 432(3) (1964).
132. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 670(2) (1964).
133. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 764(2) (1964).
134. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 773(3) (1964).
135. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 790(2) (1964).
136. POLISH CIn. CODE art. 802(2) (1964).
137. POLIs H CI. CODE art. 857(2) (1964).
138. POLIsH CIVn CODE art. 217 (1964).
139. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 1073, 1088 (1964). Some additional privileges of the
Treasury accompany this preemption right. POLISH CIVm CODE arts. 599(2), 600(2)(1964).
140. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 888(2) (1964). An analogous permission is required
for the acceptance of bequests and estates by non-state units. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts.
969, 1013 (1964).
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peasant farm or plot of land in exchange for life-long support for the
conveyor (the traditional Polish contract of use for life [dozywocie] )
has to be permitted by a state organ if the conveyee is a non-state organ-
izational unit."4' It may represent a partial donation. 4 Besides creating
a privilege in favor of the state, this strange provision discriminates not
only against non-socialist, i.e., church and other religious associations and
parishes but also at least on the surface against co-operatives and rural
circules and other "social organizations of the working people." All
donations except to the state and the individuals have to be kept under
close supervision and control.
The special provisions regulating the liability of the state for
damage done by its officials during performance of their duties 48 have
a dual aspect. On the one hand they restrict state liability in principle to
cases where damage is inflicted by violation of criminal or disciplinary
law and the guilt of the perpetrator is determined in a criminal sentence
or disciplinary decision or admitted by his superior. Hence it may be
considered as a state privilege, a lexr specialis more favorable than the
common rule of liability for torts. 44
But the political and legal significance of this lex specialis points
overwhelmingly in the opposite direction. Before the 1956 upheaval
there was in Poland no state liability whatever for damage done by
acts of state authority, and citizens had no remedy even against tortures
and death inflicted during secret police interrogations and in prisons.
After the events of October 1956 a statute was enacted on November
15, 1956, re-introducing state liability for damage inflicted by state
officials."' It contained a provision (also taken over by the civil code)
enabling a court to grant indemnification for bodily injury or loss of
a parent or guardian when principles of social intercourse require it
even if no criminal or disciplinary sentence has been obtained-par-
ticularly when the victim is an invalid or in a serious financial situation. 4
The statute of November 15, 1956, generally regarded as an important
step toward restoring the rule of law in Poland, has been incorporated
into the civil code, thus making it semi-permanent.
From the above, the conclusion seems to follow that the attempt
to preserve the traditional framework of the law of obligations for the
141. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 909 (1964).
142. Wasilkowski, supra note 120, at 575.
143. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 417-21 (1964).
144. A provision along these lines may be found in HUNGAIAX CIVIL CoDE § 349
(1959).
145. Dz. U. No. 54 poz. 243.
146. PoLis CivIL CODE art. 419 (1964).
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whole area of domestic exchange of goods and commodities, whether
socialized or not, resulted inevitably in frequent departures from general
rules in order to accommodate the needs of the social sector of planned
economy. The principle of freedom of contract had to be explicitly
abandoned in this field. The principle of equality of parties before the
law was not retained in relations between citizens and state and socialized
units. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Polish civil code have shown that
it is to a great degree possible to preserve and adjust the Western
capitalist legal system to a centrally state-directed planned economy based
on social property of means of production.
SOME POLISH INSTITUTIONS RETAINED
A conservative tendency was frankly admitted by the drafters of
the Polish Civil Code. When explaining in the official comments accom-
panying the last draft why the traditional principle of culpability (French
principle of faute) was retained as basis for liability for damages,'1 7 they
stress that it was done "in spite of theoretical doubts" because it "made
possible the retention in force of a rich body of judicial decisions which
solve in accordance with social needs the many problems raised by the
accepted provision." ' Thus the Soviet casual principle of liability for
damages and the Soviet presumption of fault 4 ' was rejected as well as the
Soviet principle that as a rule only illegal actions create such a liability.50
Contrary to the Soviet doctrine that only material (property)
damage has to be indemnified and moral grief and even physical pain
suffered can and should not be repaired in money, the Polish Civil Code
retains the traditional Polish compensation for moral harm (krzywda)
to be paid in money to the victim by the wrongdoer. It may be granted
in case of bodily injury or disruption of health, deprival of liberty, and
in cases where a woman was induced by deceit, force, or abuse of
dependent status to submit to a lewd act."' However, the remaining
part of Polish tradition vesting such a right to reparation for moral
harm and suffering in the surviving children and widow of a victim who
lost his life through another man's fault and in a victim of slander or
libel, though hotly debated, was not included as contrary to socialist
morality. As a pseudo-compromise, the victim of slander or libel or of an
147. POLISH Civm CODE art. 415 (1964) is almost a literal reproduction of the fa-
mous formula in the FmNcH CLn. CODE art. 1382 (1804).
148. PROJEKT (1962) at 212.
149. R.S.F.S.R. Civxi CODE art. 444 (1964). The same principles were accepted by
the C.S.R. ClvuM CODE § 420 (1964).
150. R.S.F.S.R. Civii CODE art. 444(3) (1964). See LiIPENS, LA FAUTE ET -'ACTE
ILLICITE EN DROIT COMPARE in MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN DABIN 725-741 (1963).
151. POLISH CIvM CODE art. 445 (1964).
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infringement on copyright or patent (or similar personal rights) was
granted the right to demand that the wrongdoer pay an appropriate
amount of money to the Polish Red Cross,"5 2 thus creating a moral
satisfaction for the victim.
A rather solidaristic idea was introduced in the law of obligations.
It consists of the general legal duty of any debtor and any creditor to
cooperate in the fulfillment of the obligation. This cooperation has to be
guided by the contents of the obligation, the social-economic destination,
and the principles of social intercourse and established customs.' It is
highly ironical that this idea of cooperation has been borrowed by the
Polish communist legislators from the fascist (!) Italian civil code of
Mussolini of 1942.'
This duty to cooperate is broader and more specific when both
debtor and creditor happen to be units of social economy. It embraces
also the conclusion of the contract itself and has as its guidelines the
duties flowing from the national economic plan, the requirements of an
economical production and distribution and avoidance of losses to the
national economy."'
The new Polish Civil Code, with an eye on the fact that in the
present Polish economy the creditor in the great majority of cases is a
state or cooperative unit, grants the creditor broader powers than did the
late capitalistic socially minded civil codes (including the Polish Code of
obligations of 1933). This tendency is quite clear when both sides of
the obligations are units of socialized economy " as well as in contracts
reserved exclusively for such units, i.e., supply of goods to be produced
and construction. 7 The right of the creditor to inspect the debtor's
factory and check his production methods is the most striking.' The
same right of supervision and inspection serves the creditor (always a
social unit) in relation to the debtor (as a rule, a private farmer, some-
times a rural co-operative) under the contract of raising and delivering
agricultural produce (kontraktacja)."' But the most radical step in this
direction consists of the general authorization granted to all creditors
to use self-help in case of urgency without the permission of a court by
152. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 448 (1964).
153. PoLI H CIVIL CODE art. 354 (1964).
154. Wolter, op. cit. supra note 74, at 217; see also ITALIAN CIVIL CODE arts. 1615-
1620 (1942) concerning "interesse della produzione."
155. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 386 (1964).
156. POLIsH CIVIL CODE arts. 386, 489 (1964).
157. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 605-12, 647-58 (1954).
158. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 608 (1964).
159. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 617 (1964).
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performing themselves the action due by the debtor or removing uni-
laterally what the debtor did contrary to his duty to refrain."'
INHERITANCE LAW
There are few noteworthy features in the inheritance law (Book
IV).61 The main features of Western classical inheritance law (a blend
of individualism and legal obligatory family ties) are preserved intact.
There is almost complete freedom of last will and testament and be-
quest. 62 The circle of legal heirs has been already narrowed in the 1946
statute on inheritance to descendants, to surviving spouse, parents,
siblings, and their descendants.' After all, the system of the German
civil code of 1896 extending the circle of legal heirs to the great-grand-
parents and their descendants and even further up and down 64 reflects
the feudal and ancient "grand family" and not the small family (unit)
of the modern mobile industrialized Western society, and has been
already obsolete for decades in Western Europe. Nevertheless, a limited
extension of this circle has been introduced now in Poland in favor of
grandparents who are in need;6 this was obviously done to bring the
law in line with public opinion and a popular sense of justice.
It seems that inheritance law can safely be taken over practically
unchanged by a society based on social property and state-directed
planned economy because what is to be inherited is decided outside the
framework of inheritance law. The farther socialization goes the more
personal property-only-is inherited.166
There is, however, one major and very important innovation. A
separate and different inheritance law for peasant farms has been
introduced16 alongside the above-described restrictions on alienations
160. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 480(3) (1964). Arts. 479 ard 552 strengthen the legal
position of every creditor.
161. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 922-1057 (1964).
162. A radically individualistic and liberal provision authorizes a contractual re-
nunciation of the future estate by the legal heir inter vivos. The renunciation includes
the descendants. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 1048-1050 (1964).
163. Law of Oct. 8, 1946, Dz. U. No. 60 poz. 328.
164. It is paradoxical that the HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE § 610 (1959) preserves this
relic of antiquity including great-grandparents and their issue into the circle of legal
heirs. Even the AusTRlAN CIVIL CODE art. 741 (1811) excluded the issue of great-
grandparents. The Hungarian Minister of Justice said that the old law of succession
,was "deeply rooted in our people's legal mentality." CIVIL CODE OF THE HuNGAR IA
PEOPLE'S REPULIC 196 (1960).
165. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 938 (1964). A similar provision, art. 966, applies to
testamentary inheritance.
166. The authors of the C.S.R. CIVIL CODE (1964) seem to share this opinion. There
is nothing particularly original in Part VII of the code. It is a far cry from the abolition
of inheritance law demanded by the Communist Manifesto of 1848.
167. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 1058-1088 (1964).
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and divisions of peasant farms inter vivos. The circle of legal heirs
is a narrower one for peasant farms than the general one. Great-
grandchildren and descendants of siblings are excluded.' A peasant
farm has to remain and belong to the immediate next of kin.
The main features of this class law are:
(1) The requirement of qualifications to run a farm for legal
heirs, testamentary heirs, legatees, acquirers through division, or pur-
chasers of the estate farm." 9 The idea is that only those who are capable
of keeping agricultural production at a satisfactory level should own and
run them.
(2) The process of dividing peasant farms into ever smaller parts
by conveyances inter vivos and by inheritance should be halted.
(3) The deprivation of private peasant economy of money needed
for investment by excessive periodic or one-shot payments to co-heirs
who did not get the estate farm or to such co-owners should be pre-
vented. Therefore such payments may be reduced by the court to make
them economically bearable by the peasant farm left by the deceased
and by its new peasant owner (heir). Some categories of heirs may be
completely deprived of any such participation in the peasant estate.'
A kind of supplementary specialized though unavowed inheritance
law is created by provisions placing certain assets outside the scope of the
general inheritance law and inheritance proceedings.
A recent amendment to the Polish Banking Law of 1962... obliges
a state bank to reimburse the burial costs of a saving account depositor
out of his saving account to a person who actually paid them, and what
is more important, to honor after the depositor's death his written request
for a bequest up to 50,000 zl. to his wife, children, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, or siblings. Any such sums remain outside of the deceased
estate and inheritance proceedings. 2 Less surprising is a provision con-
tained in the Polish Civil Code proper providing that a sum stipulated
in a life or accident insurance contract due to be paid to the beneficiary
in case of death of the insured does not form a part of his estate.7 3
There is no doubt that these Polish and Russian institutions have been
patterned after their Western capitalist models.
168. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 1060(1), 1062(3) (1964).
169. POLIsH CIVIL CODE arts. 1059-62, 1065, 1067, 1069, 1071 (1964).
170. PoLISH CIvIL CODE arts. 1075-77 (1964).
171. Law of February 25, 1964, Dz. U. No. 8 poz. 50 amending the Bank Law,
April 13, 1960, Dz. U. No. 20 poz. 121.
172. An analogous and more liberal provision is found in R.S.F.S.R. CVIL CODE art.
561 (1964) which does not restrict in any manner the freedom to choose legatees from a
savings account nor limits the bequest by any ceiling.
173. POLISr CIviL CODE art. 831(3) (1964).
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PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE
The new Polish Civil Code puts heavy and often repeated emphasis
not only on the social-economic destination of rights and duties but
also on "principles of social intercourse." The nature of these principles
can be traced back to the Stalin Constitution of 1936 which makes it a
duty of every citizen "to respect the rules of socialist society" (Art. 130).
Soviet jurists were generally of the opinion that socialist-Marxist moral-
ity, as opposed to bourgeois morality, is meant. The same concept of
socialist ethics was introduced under Soviet influence into Polish civil
law in 1950 under the name of "principles of social intercourse in the
People's State"17 and in 1959 in Hungary under the name of "demands
of socialist coexistence."' 75
Socialist morality (as referred to in Art. 3 of the general provisions
of civil law dealing with abuse of rights) was used on a wide scale in
Poland since 1950 to rescind or change by Supreme Court decisions
many important specific provisions of the still binding Polish pre-war
civil legislation without the benefit of any new legislative enactment and
in clear violation of the law in force. After the events of October 1956,
a sustained effort was made to eliminate entirely the provision of Art. 3
from the new civil code as dangerous for the newly restored socialist
legality and the 1960 draft actually omitted it.176 The judicature of the
Supreme Court after 1956 began to construe principles of social inter-
course as referring not to some doctrinal class warfare teachings of
Marxism-Leninism but to moral principles actually adopted and recog-
nized as binding by public opinion of the population. Thus, they acquired
to some degree the features of the traditional Western boni mores, a
permanent fixture of the Western law system.
The complete omission of any provision governing misuse of rights
(because that was the ostensible purpose of Art. 3) proved to be a too
radical measure for routine-minded Polish jurists on the one hand and
Stalinist-oriented party members who slowly regained influence since
1959 on the other. During the public discussion of the 1960 draft, strong
opposition developed against total omission of Art. 3. The new code not
only contains Art. 5 defining abuse of rights and retains the criterion of
"contradiction with the principles of social intercourse in the Polish
People's Republic" but couples it alternatively with a second measuring
174. Law of July 18, 1950, General Provisions of Civil Law arts. 3, 41, 47, 82.
Dz. U. No. 34 poz. 311.
175. HUNGARIAN CivI. CODE § 4(2) (1959).
176. PROJEKT KODEKSU CYWILNEGO POLSxIEj RZECZYPOSPOLITEj Ltmow j 7 (1960).
However, references to "principles of social intercourse" wern, made in some detailed
provisions of the draft.
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rod, i.e., "contradiction with the social-economic destination" of the right
appraised. Thus, according to the official comment, the criterion be-
comes more concrete.' The trouble is that for misuse to be present, the
contradiction with only one of the two criteria is sufficient. Therefore,
the question, what will be understood by "principles of social intercourse"
remains as crucial as before.
The trend in Poland seems toward assuming that what is meant
is the prevailing moral convictions, values, and attitudes in "the minds of
citizens," a kind of "social conscience." These moral standards are not
static; they are evolving and changing as a result of transformations of
social and economic relationsY7 a What seems to follow is that the courts
have to apply only those values which have been already accepted by the
population as part of their "social conscience" and refrain from imposing
arbitrarily or prematurely abstract doctrinal precepts.
The same standpoint has been expressed even more pointedly by
another Polish jurist who bluntly rejects the accepted opinion that the
principles of social intercourse are precepts of ethics or morality, Marxist
or otherwise, evaluating behavior in terms of good and evil, and stresses
that what is meant are actual rules of intercourse, largely of an organiza-
tional nature, in present day Polish society more concrete in their de-
mands than moral precepts.'
Thus, the principles of social intercourse came somewhat closer to
earth, but still retain their changing dynamic character. In the hands of
the Supreme Court, issuing binding directives and acting under the guid-
ance of the Communist Party, they may become at any time not a
reflection of existing reality but a tool of remodeling the civil law and
pushing economic and personal relations a step or two further on the
road to socialism. This feature of flexibility which the principles of
social intercourse are granting to the provisions of the new civil code has
been stressed by two of its main sponsors."' It enables adaptation of
the code to the requirements of a changing social and economic structure.
According to reliable reports, there are at the present time no intentions
to use them for radical transformation from above of Polish society
or economy in the direction of the communist goal. On the contrary,
there is, as far as could be learned, a widespread desire to improve
things within the present framework and run it more efficiently. But
177. PROJEKT (1962), at 203. The social-economic destination is easy to ascertain
in relations between socialized units. The national economic plan provides the yardstick.
177a. Wasilkowski, op. cit. supra note 79, at 745.
178. WOLTER, PRAIVO CYVILNE, ZARYS CZESCI OGOLNEj 62-64 (1963).
179. Wasilkowski, op. cit. supra note 79, at 745. Marian Rybicki, Znacaenie
kodyfikacji prawa cyzvilnego w okresie budownictwa socializmu, Nowe Prawo June 1963,
p. 617.
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the civil code includes the tools needed to turn it from an instrument
of stabilization and preservation of things as they are into an instrument
of social change.
Role of Social Ethics. This possibility is enhanced by the important
role assigned to the principles of social intercourse by the new code
irrespective of the manner in which they are understood. One thing is
now beyond dispute in Poland: they do not form part of the written
law which refers to them and they are not legal but rather "social" or
moral principles. In order to appraise correctly the role played by those
principles in the system of the new Polish Civil Code, two points must be
made clear:
1. The admittedly vague content of the principles of social intercourse
enables the courts to bring under this heading a fanatical, class-warfare,
militant, partisan, orthodox Marxist-Lenist spirit overriding binding
and specific provisions of the law, as well as on the other extreme the
prevailing Christian ethics of the Polish population, leaving room in
between for a humanistic, social-minded morality of a "state of the
whole people" in which class-warfare is a thing of the past.
The Polish Minister of Justice tried to define those principles by
stressing that they protect "interests of a higher rank" against formally
legal claims. The examples quoted by him make it clear that some of the
protected "interests" represent socially useful institutions (eviction of a
pharmacy, kindergarten, peasant farm, or removal of a building on
another man's plot) while others are rather of a moral nature (cases
approaching exploitation, guarantee of minimum standard of life to the
debtor),."' Such an interpretation would place the principles discussed
somewhere between the Stalinist rigidity and belligerence and the post-
1956 Westernized humanistic attitude of 1956-1958. Therefore, in spite
of the obvious fact that Western Continental, as vell as common-law
legislation fully accepts and practices the principle that the social interest
takes priority over private and personal interests, there still remains a
significant difference in contents between the kind of morality referred
to and operating through Vestern civil codes and socialist ethics even of
the post-Stalinist type in communist civil codes. This point must be kept
in mind when comparing several provisions of the new Polish code with
their Western counterparts and finding a close resemblance.'
2. Alongside such provisions, clearly taken over from Western
civil legislation and filled with a new content, we find a number of prac-
tically new (non-Western) provisions referring to social (or socialist)
180. Rybicki, supra note 179, at 616.
181. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 58, 93, 94, 56, 65, 354, 411, 5, 415, 902, 1008 (1964).
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morality. The most important in the first category is the above discussed
Art. 5 about abuse of civil rights.'82 Equally new is the above-stressed
introduction of the principles of social intercourse into the contents of the
right of property, easements, and perpetual usufruct.'
The new institution of a subsidiary liability of the State Treasury
for bodily injuries or loss of a provider caused by state officials, a
liability based directly on social morality..4 was also mentioned above.
A similar subsidiary liability for damages, based directly on social ethics,
is imposed on a minor and an incompetent who caused it, if, the damages
cannot be recovered otherwise and a comparison of the financial situation
of the perpetrator and of the victim justifies it.8 5 The same applies to
damage caused by a domestic animal or an animal kept in custody. This
subsidiary liability, based directly on principles of social intercourse, has
been placed on the person keeping or using the animal. 6 Liability for
damages may not only be extended beyond the fault principle, but in-
demnity may be also restricted on grounds of morality if a comparison
of the financial conditions of the person liable with those of the victim
justifies it.' 7
A radical innovation may be found in the chapter on property
insurance. The insuring institution is as a rule not obliged to pay
indemnity when the insured caused the damage through flagrant negli-
gence or failed to undertake steps to prevent and diminish the possible
damage. Nevertheless, even then the insured indemnity has to be paid
in full or in part if, under the given circumstances, the principles of social
intercourse or the interests of national economy so require.' 8
A clearly Soviet-inspired provision declares the forfeiture for the
benefit of the Treasury of any performance or payment deliberately
182. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 5 (1964) which enjoins everybody to act in accordance
with morality is similar to Swiss CIVIL CODE art. 2 (Treu und Glauben) (1907).
183. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 140, 233, 287, 298 (1964).
184. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 419 (1964).
185. POLIsHE CiVI. CODE art. 428 (1964) is similar to R.S.F.S.R. CIviL, CODE art. 406
(1922) which does not invoke socialist intercourse. It must be noted, however, that the
SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 54 (1881) and the POLISH CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 143
(1933) contained an analogous provision based on equity (billigkeit).
186. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 431 (1964). Here again the POLISH CODE OF OBLIGA-
TIONS art. 149 (1933) was parallel.
187. POLISH CIVIL CODE art. 440 (1964) is similar to R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 411(1922) and R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 458 (1964) which do not, however, invoke social-
ist intercourse.
188. POLISH CIVIL CODE arts. 826(2), 827 (1964). Of lesser importance are art.
446 granting a claim based on social morality for a life pension as indemnity to persons
whom the dead tort victim voluntarily and constantly supported without legal obligation
to do so and art. 754 granting a claim for reimbursement of expenses to a negotiorum
gestor who acted against the known will of the person whose business he took care of if
the latter's will was contrary to social morality.
NEW COMMUNIST CIVIL CODES
made in return for a deed contrary to social morality or in fulfillment
of a transaction of the same nature.' Western continental civil codes
leave forfeiture and confiscation as clearly penal measures to the criminal
courts and codes.
The sweeping use made by communist civil ccdes, and the Polish
code in particular, of the principles of social intercourse recalls the
passionate attacks made by Soviet jurists and their imitators against
the "general clauses" introduced in the capitalist civil codes of the
period of imperialism (B.G.B. and Swiss Z.G.B.) and the growing role
played by such concepts as "gute Sitten!' and "Trcu und Glauben" as
symptoms of the bankruptcy of bourgeois legality. 9 ' It is therefore
difficult to refrain from a suspicion that the new general clauses again
referring to morality represent potentially as many escape clauses from
socialist legality, creating the possibility of overriding legal consider-
ations when and where considered as politically necessary.
CONCLUSION
The overall impression created by an analysis of the new Polish
Civil Code is that it attempts to stabilize and consolidate the present
Polish economic and social system at its present stage, not quite unlike
Stalin's attempt in the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936.1' What is to be
stabilized is not only the Soviet model of economy accepted in industry,
trade, communication, and banking, but also the overwhelmingly private-
ly owned peasant agriculture. Further deviations from Soviet law consist
in the retention of the French system of tort liability based on fault to be
proven by the claimant and embracing not only illegal actions but viola-
tions of social morality as well. Equally retained was the institution of
money compensation for physical pain and moral harm in cases of bodily
injury, deprivation of liberty, and sexual abuse.
A new uniform definition of the contents of the right of ownership
has been formulated and a hierarchy of three unequal but coexisting
basic types of ownership constructed. An analogous inequality of rights
and duties prevails in the field of obligations. Here, however, privileges
of state and social juristic persons are counterbalanced by a stricter
discipline imposed on them. The duty of debtor and creditor to cooperate
in the fulfillment of the contract strikes a XVestern-trained jurist as a
189. PoISH CIVIL CODE art. 412 (1964) is similar to R.S.F.S.R. CrVIL CODE art. 473(1964) but the latter does not mention socialist intercourse but rather "the interest of the
socialist state and society."
190. An example from East Germany: KLEINE, DAS KIVILRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN
DEMnOKRATISCHEiN REPUBLIK 56-57 (1958), "It is a small step indeed from the general
clause to the Fuhrerbefehl [order of the Fuhrer]."
191. HAzAR, op. cit. supra note 12, at XXXII.
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significant idea. The often repeated emphasis on principles of social
intercourse as a limitation of the exercise of civil rights and as a direct
source of legal duties and claims seems to exceed the Soviet model. Its
significance depends on the meaning which practice will attach to them.
They may perform .a function similar to the old notion of boni mores,
providing the civil code with the flexibility needed for adaptation to
changing social and economic developments and keeping the judicature
in line with moral standards accepted by the bulk of population. They
may, however, serve as a tool of imposing drastic changes from above
without the benefit of a formal amendment of the law in force, should
a militant class-war oriented and doctrinal meaning be given to them.
Therefore, a clear-cut answer to the question whether the Polish
civil code can be considered a revolutionary one in the sense the
Napoleonic code is cannot be easily given. The Polish code certainly is
not revolutionary when compared with the Czechoslovak code. When
compared with the Code Napoleon, the obvious difference is that there
was no spontaneous social revolution in Poland preceding its enactment.
The Soviet system was introduced from above. That makes a big differ-
ence. There was, however, a spontaneous revulsion against the Stalinist
terror and oppression in 1956 and a return to a modicum of "socialist
legality" and "socialist democracy" vaguely reminiscent of the last stages
of the French Revolution. Only when we remember the firm determina-
tion of the authors of the Code Napol~on to avoid any unnecessary
innovations192 will it be possible to give reluctantly an affirmative
answer. Certainly any crusading ideology is absent. Whatever ideology
exists is ambivalent and vague. Therefore, "post-revolutionary" would
be a much better characterization of the new Polish code.
192. PORTALIS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 2-5.
